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Nutimaja häkkimine
Lühikokkuvõte: Nutimaja on intelligentne kodu, mis on varustatud erinevate
seadmete ja infosüsteemidega ning lubab maja elanikel neid süsteeme juhtida. See
tehnoloogia on muutnud mugavamaks viisi, kuidas tarbija suhtleb oma koduga,
andes talle paremat kontrolli seadmete üle. Samuti on sellel tehnoloogial posi-
tiivne mõju maja energiasäästlikusele. Tarbijate suurest huvist hoolimata on selle
tehnoloogia kasutuselevõttu takistanud kasutajate ebakindlus nende süsteemide
turvalisuses.
Antud magistritöö uurib nutimaja platvormidega seotud turva- ja privaatsus-
probleeme. Konkreetsemalt uuritakse platvormi nimega CoSSmic. Samuti antakse
hinnang targa kodu ja HomeMatic tarkade pistikute vahelise suhtluse turvalisuse-
le. Uuritakse ka CoSSMic platvormi turvalisust veebis laialt levinud ohtude vastu.
Leitud probleemidele esitatakse soovitused ja vastuemeetmed, et parandusi saaks
rakendada vaatlusalustel platvormildel. Demonstreeritakse ka kahte rünnakut ees-
märgiga võtta üle HomeMatic targa pistiku juhtimine.
Võtmesõnad: Nutimaja, CoSSMic, Asjade Internet, micro-grid, smart plug, kor-
dusrünnak, HomeMatic
CERCS: P170
2
Smart Home Hacking
Abstract: Smart Home is an intelligent home equipped with devices and com-
munications systems that enables the residents to connect and control their home
appliances and systems. This technology has changed the way a consumer inter-
acts with his home, enabling more control and convenience. Another advantage
of this technology is the positive impact it has on savings on energy and other re-
sources. However, despite the consumer’s excitement about smart home, security
and privacy have shown to be the strongest obstacles to the adaption with this
technology.
This work investigates the security and privacy issues found at an emerging
smart home technology such as the CoSSMic platform. The security of the com-
munication between the smart home and the connected devices through Home-
Matic smart plugs is assessed. CoSSMic platform is also investigated for common
web vulnerabilities. Finally, recommendations and countermeasures are given to
deploy the fixes on CoSSMic platform before the product release. Moreover, two
attacks are performed in order to take the control of HomeMatic smart plug.
Keywords: Smart Home, CoSSMic, Internet of Things, micro-grid, smart plug,
replay attack, HomeMatic
CERCS: P170
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1 Introduction
This section provides a short introduction to the thesis topic and the motivation
behind this research work. In addition, it gives a brief overview of the CoSSMic
project which defines the scope of our study. Finally, it presents the outline of the
thesis.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Smart Home
With the rapid evolution of IOT, the consumer’s experience with the home ap-
pliances and the concept of “home” itself has been redefined. Smart home is no
longer a futuristic reality. It represents the most compelling application domain
of IOT [1, 2].
The smart home is an intelligent home equipped with devices and commu-
nications systems that enables the residents to connect and control their home
appliances and systems [3]. Smart home definition has evolved and changed with
the involvement of new technologies since 1990s. According to a recent definition
given by [4], “a home which is smart enough to assist the inhabitants to live inde-
pendently and comfortably with the help of technology is termed as smart home.
In a smart home, all the mechanical and digital devices are interconnected to form
a network, which can communicate with each other and with the user to create
an interactive space”. A smart home is described by [5] as the house with the
smart home technology installed on it. According to [6] “smart home technology”
implies “a collective term for Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
as used in houses, where the various components are communicating via a local
network ”, which can later be used to “monitor, warn and carry out functions ac-
cording to selected criteria”. In [7, 8] the smart home technology is defined as
“the integration of technology and services through home networking for a better
quality of living”.
These definitions indicate that the primary objective of a smart home is to
ease the experience of the inhabitants with their home and appliances. However,
the concept of smart home does not simply refers to the remote monitoring and
controlling of the connected devices. With the use of embedded computing and
residential smart metering, smart homes also are transformed into energy-aware
environments, giving the user the ability to manage and optimize the energy con-
sumption and energy costs in their homes [5]. According to Schwarz [1], the
smart home is a network of connected components in the living area communi-
cating with each other in order to increase the residents comfort level and the
efficiency of their energy consumption. Having an overview of the energy usage
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and production in a smart home in the real-time, the consumers will improve the
energy savings up to 30% as well as reducing the power bills [9, 10]. Such smart
homes will communicate with the smart grid to automatically adjust their energy
profile, while remotely monitoring their home appliances [11]. Thus, smart home
is the main component in a smart grid. Consequently, security and privacy issues
faced by the smart home technology have a strong impact on the overall security
and the function of the smart grid.
1.1.2 The CoSSMic project description
This Master’s thesis is part of CoSSMic project, which is an EU funded project.
The thesis presents the first in-depth security analysis of the CoSSMic project. It
addresses the security and privacy issues of this platform.
CoSSMic 1 (Collaborating Smart Solar-powered Microgrids, FP7- SMART CITIES,
2013) is an EU-project that aims at fostering higher rate of self-consumption of de-
centralised renewable energy production, by coordinating the energy production,
consumption, and use of energy storage units of the micro-grids in a neighbour-
hood [12, 13]. The project develops an intelligent ICT platform that would allow
the house inhabitants to exchange and negotiate energy within their neighborhood.
In addition, it will bring them two benefits: reducing consumer’s power bills and
the optimization of green energy in the households and neighborhoods.
In the CoSSMic context, a micro-grid refers to a smart home or an office build-
ing equipped with electrical devices, PV panels and energy storages [12].
The CoSSMicplatform is deployed in an embedded hardware, which is offered
to the user as a packaged hardware and installed in every household. Each plat-
form instance communicates over a peer-to-peer overlay with other households in
order to negotiate energy within the neighborhood based on user’s constraints and
preferences [14, 15].
1.2 Motivation
Regardless of the convenience that brings to the consumer’s daily life, SHT might
also expose them to a wide range of threats, putting at risk their own privacy and
safety. Actually, concerns about security and privacy of IoT environments have
been identified as one of the top barriers to wider adoption of smart home tech-
nology [2]. Considering that the CoSSMic is under development phase, addressing
the vulnerabilities found in the system, will prevent any potential data breaches
or security threats in the future product release. Having a clear picture about the
security status of a system prior to product releases, does not only increase secu-
rity awareness, but it can also reduce the costs for fixing discovered vulnerabilities.
1http://cossmic.eu/
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The thesis goal is to contribute to the existing literature by giving a more practical
approach
1.3 Problem statement
This thesis presents the first in-depth security analysis of the CoSSMic platform.
The main purpose of this research is to address the security and privacy issues of
the platform:
• To do a literature study of security and privacy of smart home technology
• To set up a CoSSMic virtual environment
• To test with automated tools and/or provide a Proof-of-Concept exploit code
In the problem description there is an additional task: To produce a security
patch. During the intensive work on this thesis for more than 7 months, I came
to a conclusion that producing a security patch is out of the range of capability
of any single master student. It is a serious task with a work volume of at least 4
man-years and should be done by a team of researchers and developers.
1.4 Methodology
This section describes the methodology that has been used to carry out this the-
sis work. The methodology is illustrated in figure 1. The thesis starts with a
definition of the research area. It follows with the CoSSMic project description.
Within the scope of this research work, the technologies used in a smart home
and the security and privacy requirements are presented. The setup of the target
system is described and a guideline on the possible attacks in the system is given.
Furthermore, the technical security evaluation of the HomeMatic smart plug and
the target system is presented.
1.5 Delimitations
The scope of this research will be focused only on the security of the web appli-
cation and the communication between the HomeMatic smart plug and the home
gateway. Since CoSSMic platform is still under the development phase and it is not
stable, it was not possible to deploy a part of the system (MAS) which consists on
the communication between smart homes for energy negotiation. However, during
the development and testing phase when the system was stable, we were able to
get some security analysis results. They will be described as vulnerabilities that
may lead to potential security attacks.
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Figure 1: Research Methodology
1.6 Outline
The thesis is structured as follows:
• Section 1: This section defines the smart home and it includes the intro-
duction, project description, problem statement and the delimitations of the
research work.
• Section 2: This section presents the main technologies used in a smart home.
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In the section, security and privacy requirements on smart home technology
are presented. It also gives a background of the related on the security and
privacy challenges of the smart home technology.
• Section 3: This section describes the CoSSMic and the technologies imple-
mented in the prototype.
• Section 4 : This section describes the setting up of the CoSSMic virtual lab
and the testing environment for the security assessment. Furthermore, this
section describes the guidelines on how to evaluate the security of the current
deployed CoSSMic.
• Section 5: This section describes the vulnerabilities found in the target sys-
tem.
• Section 6: This section discusses the outcomes of the security analysis and
gives recommendations on how to mitigate the vulnerabilities found in the
system.
• Section 7: This section summarizes the result found in the thesis work.
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2 Background and related work
The section presents an overview of the technologies implemented in a smart home,
highlighting those related to the CoSSMic project. Furthermore, it briefly ad-
dresses the current security status of these technologies. The following section
defines the security objectives of a smart home technology. Additionally, potential
attacks against these objectives are presented. Finally, we discuss on the previ-
ous work done regarding the security and privacy challenges of the smart home
technology.
2.1 Technologies in the smart home environment
2.1.1 Communication protocols
The electrical devices in a smart home are monitored and controlled through a
Home Area Network (HAN). A HAN enables the communication of the in-house
devices with the smart meter. On the other side, smart homes are connected to
the Internet through a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)or a wired Local
Area Network (LAN). In a HAN, the following protocols are used to provide the
communication with the connected devices:
• WIFI WIFI is a popular wireless networking technology. This protocol uses
radio waves to provide wireless high-speed Internet and network connections.
WiFi operates on the 2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz frequency bands.
• ZigBee It is a low-rate, short range, an open wireless IEEE communication
standard protocol, developed by the ZigBee Alliance. ZigBee operates on 2.4
GHz frequency band.
• Z-Wave It is a low-power wireless protocol which transmits data between
868.4 MHz and 926.3 MHz frequency band for in-home communication and
remote applications control.
• EnOcean EnOcean 2 is a radio based communication protocol developed by
the EnOcean GmbH. It is optimized for very low power consumption and
energy harvesting. This allows the devices to not use any external power
supply or batteries.
2https://www.enocean.com/en/
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2.1.2 BidCos
HomeMatic devices use a proprietary radio based communication protocol (Bidi-
rectional Communication Standard,BidCoS), which works on a frequency of 868
MHz . It is a bidirectional protocol, in which commands get acknowledged with
the state of the device. Bidcos does not provide encryption. An AES authentica-
tion handshake is used for the authentication of the sending device. The BidCos
[16] packet structure is shown in Table 1.
Offset Byte length Description
0 1 Packet Length
1 1 Message Counter
2 1 Control Byte
3 1 Message Type
4 3 Sender Address
7 3 Destination Address
10 1 to n Payload
Table 1: BidCoS packet structure
2.1.3 Home Energy Management System
Home Energy Management System (HEMS) is a service or utility that enables
users to automatically control the energy usage of their home appliances, col-
lect and generate a dashboard with real-time data about the energy consumption
fromdifferent home appliances and reduce the user’s electricity bills [17]. Emon-
CMS 3 is one of the leading technologies within this category. It is an open-source
web-app for processing, logging and visualising energy, temperature and other en-
vironmental data. EmonCMS is part of OpenEnergyMonitor project. The project
develops open-source hardware and software platform for energy monitoring.
2.2 Smart Home micro-computers
Smart home micro-computers are small sized computers that are used to control
the operations of smart home system. Raspberry Pi is one of the technologies used
as a smart home micro-computer. Raspberry Pi is a small credit-card sized micro-
computer that plugs into a monitor or TV using HDMI, together with a keyboard
and a mouse. It can be used as an educational environment to learn programming
and computing at an affordable price. In this research, it is selected Raspberry Pi
3https://emoncms.org/
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Figure 2: Frontside of circuit board of RPi 2 model B with plugged CUL
2 model B (see figure 2. This version is the second generation of RPis, released
in February 2015. Raspberry Pi 2 model B, has the following specifications [18]:
• A quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU processor running at 900MHz
• 1 GB RAM
• Four USB-ports
• One 10/100 Megabit/s Ethernet-port
• One micro-SD card slot
• One full HDMI port
• 40 GPIO pins
• Camera interface (CSI)
• Display interface (DSI)
• Combined 3.5mm audio jack and composite video
• VideoCore IV 3D graphics core
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2.3 Threats on the web area
The CoSSMic architecture and its web area is analyzed and based on the testing
of potential security issues, a list of potential web threats is created:
• Insecure remote access system Providing a secure way to remotely control
the system over the internet. The method that is going to be elacted depends
on the security features that each of them provides. SEC consult lists four
ways which are proposed by different vendors to connect over the internet:
– Port forwarding: the router webinterface is configured to forward public
traffic on a public port to the internal port of the central base station.
Port forwarding although is easy to configure, it poses serious issues
when it comes to the security (as it is also shown in the later section).
The data that are transmitted over the network can be captured and
analyzed by an attacker. Also, in this access mechanism, hackers can
easily perform port scanning and find out the open ports.
– VPN: A VPN allows the remote control user to access the VPN-server of
private local-area network (LAN) as if the user is physically connected at
the site. This method requires moderately easy configuration compared
to Port Forwarding. This method provides multiple level of security
such as encryption of all data transmitted to and from connected devices
and limiting the lines of source code exposed to the Internet making it
secure against attacks from the internet. Thus, Raspberry Pi will be
secure (behind firewalls) and only accessible over the Internet when the
user is first logged in the VPN connection and then to web interface
login form. However, the port forwarding will still need to be set up
since it will need some predictions from a cloud server (internet). We
suggest to use the open-source VPN service, OpenVPN, in order to
establish a secure remote access with the system. CoSSMic requires the
use of open-source systems. SEC Consult [1] recommends this method
for remote access.
2.4 Security requirements
This section summarizes several security requirements related to the smart home
ecosystem.
2.4.1 User and device authentication
This requirement applies to both the users and devices in a smart home environ-
ment. Users and devices might perform several activities in a smart home that
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require access to sensitive information. This means that, a strong authentica-
tion mechanism should be provided in order to protect smart home home against
unauthorized users or compromised devices attacks [19]. The in-house devices
should not be remotely accessed by unauthorized users. Therefore, Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) and certificates can be implemented to support strong mutual
authentication with the servers by enabling secure channels in the smart home
ecosystem [20].
2.4.2 Secure key management
Some of the smart home devices have pre-installed security keys, which can be
exploited by the malicious attackers. Thus, a user-friendly and transparent key
management should be provided to the users [20]. This requirements ensures
authentication and it also protects against compromised firmware installations.
2.4.3 Hardware protection
Smart home devices are often vulnerable to tampering attacks. Thus, it is rec-
ommended to include measures such as tamper resistance, tamper evidence or
anti-reverse engineering schemes against these type of physical attacks [19, 20].
2.4.4 Device security certification
Each device in the smart home should be certified by a recognized authority which
claims its security [17]. In this way, it will ensure that some vendors are trusted.
2.5 Privacy requirements
ENISA [20] gives a list of guidelines about the privacy requirements of a smart
home system:
1. identify personal data in a smart home
2. implement transparency measures
3. perform a privacy assessment
2.6 Related work
This section gives a short overview of the related work on the security and privacy
challenges of the smart home technology.
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Providing security in the smart home is a very challenging task due to the
heterogeneous nature of these ecosystems. Previous research on the security of the
smart home has been focused only on the security issues of the connected devices
and the related protocols.
Denning et.al [21] survey the security and privacy of smart home technologies
and provided a strategy for thinking about the security needs in the home.
Jacobsson et.al [22] revealed that the highest risks concerning the information
within a smart home relates to inadequate access-control configuration at the in-
house gateway. They also highlight the risks of weak password deployment and
inadequate authentication. According to them, these risks can pose a serious
threat to the security especially for the single user account used within the in-
house gateway. They use a common risk analysis method based on Information
Security Risk Analysis (ISRA) in order to investigate the risk exposure of smart
home systems.
Symantec [23] performed a security analysis of 50 smart home devices and
found that most of them are prone to weak authentication (basic security issues)
and well-known web vulnerabilities. Furthermore, these devices used unencrypted
communications. SEC Consult [24, 25] showed in their advisories that it is possible
to exploit common web vulnerabilities in order to take control of a smart home.
A survey [11] has investigated the main security issues of smart homes with
an emphasis on its interaction with the smart grid. The survey proposes possible
countermeasures against identified threats that could prevent the smart home-
/smart grid environment from achieving the given security objectives. Sathya
Laufer and Christian Malles [26]demonstrated at the 30th Chaos Communication
Congress how three different attacks were performed to gain unauthorized access
at a smart home that uses a HomeMatic device which was still configured with the
same default AES key. This HomeMatic device, allow the user to unlock doors or
receive commands from a motion detector. In their tests, they used a Raspberry
Pi which runs Homegear and a wireless transceiver. The default key and the anal-
ysis of one of handshake algorithms used by HomeMatic devices could be found
at pastebin.com [27] . According to Laufer and Malles, some device use AES
handshake authentication mechanism but that it is not true for all HomeMatic
devices.
Fernandes et.al [28] implemented several proof-of-concept exploits which an
attacker could use to unlock doors, monitor the battery level of devices, set off
fake alarms in the Samsung SmartThings platform.
There are several papers showing that is possible to extract personal infor-
mation about inhabitants by analysing smart meter data [29].The consumers are
mostly concerned with the risk of suffering privacy invasion in case that their home
energy usage patterns become available to an attacker.
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3 The CoSSMic platform
In this section, an overview of the CoSSMic architecture and the technologies used
in this system is provided. In the following sections, the main components of
CoSSMic system are described. Furthermore, the current technologies that have
been chosen for the deployment of the prototype are introduced.
3.1 CoSSMic architecture
The overall architecture of CoSSMic platform is shown in 3. This platform cur-
rently adopts All in Home configuration. In the current deployment, all the main
components of the system reside on the home gateway and the cloud server is used
only for negotiating energy among different smart homes. The home gateway hosts
the main components which are responsible for the management of the smart home
such as: the device integration and Multi Agent System (MAS). Electric devices
are connected with the home gateway via special drivers which are developed from
the project.
• GUI. The GUI(see figure 4 ) enables the user to interact with the platform
by providing: real time monitoring data about the energy consumption of
the appliances, scheduled tasks, predictions and statistics on historical data.
The user can set the rules and preferences that agents must follow later to
negotiate energy.
• The Device Integration component. It provides a device management
interface for accessing and collecting data from devices. This component also
use the interface to send commands to the devices such as: switch on or off.
The Device integration implements the so-called mediator services. Media-
tor provides APIs for device data access and device control. These APIs are
accessed by the device drivers to store measurements and energy negotiation
results and by the agents to get the energy profiles of the connected devices.
• Multi Agent System. It is one of the five pillars of CoSSMic platform.
The blue boundary defines this component in the 3. MAS is a system com-
posed of interactive intelligent agents and applications collaborating together
for realizing the management and exchange of green energy while using ne-
gotiation algorithm and optimization techniques. It uses the cloud services
to build a peer to peer overlay network for energy exchange in the neighbor-
hood. Energy scheduling is implemented a as a distributed MAS, where a
MAS instance is installed on each household, ready to collaborate with other
instances in the neighborhood for energy exchange. Agents are software pro-
grams that act on behalf of user to negotiate energy. They represent the
17
Figure 3: CoSSMic platform adopted from [30]
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Figure 4: The web GUI of CoSSMic
devices in the smart home. In the CoSSMic context, the agents are capable
of:
– monitor the device energy consumption in real time
– invoking the mediator services to obtain information about the energy
profile of the devices
– use the mediator to store the results of energy negotiation within the
CoSSMic neighborhood
– sending commands such as switching on/off the power switches.
– Each household has a MAS instance that enables distributed comput-
ing and local autonomy. Within the neighborhood, the MAS instances
collaborate with each other enabling a decentralized planning and op-
timization.
The agents are classified into two categories [30, 31]:
– Consumers. These agents can only buy energy for passive devices such
as: electric car, computers, washing machine, etc.
– Producers. These agents can produce energy, therefore they can sell it
later. We will consider solar panels as an example of this category.
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The agents or the device that they represent, are able to both produce and
consume energy will be defined as Prosumers. It includes storage which are
represented by a couple of agents. In addition, a single smart house will
have many agents. MAS functionality is implemented by using the following
agents:
– Task manager: It acts as the master agent of the MAS, converts
planned tasks defined by the user into loads and sends them to the
consumer agent.
– Prediction handler: This agent computes predicted PV production
based on weather forecasts updates.
– Weather watcher: It gets the latest updates for weather forecast and
sent them to Prediction handler.
– Actor manager: manages producer and consumer agents.
– Device controller: It is responsible of the execution of scheduled loads
by the devices via the device manager module.
• The Prediction component. It uses the weather forecast data generated
by a third party, in order to compute predictions about the energy produced
by PV panels and the prices about energy exchange with the public grid.
Prediction updates happen once in every six hours. Therefore for each up-
date, the schedule will be re-planned.
3.2 The selected technologies used for the trials
Table 3 summarizes the technology used in the current trial implementation.
3.3 The Mediator
TheMediator is implemented by EmonCMS (see section 2). The EmonCMS frame-
work originally consists of five core modules, written in PHP with some Javascript
functionality provided:
• input - this module pre-processes input data before inserting it in the database.
• feed -provides functionality for inserting, storing and retrieving time stamped
data in the database.
• vis - the visualizations module can analyze large data sets and generate
graphics in different formats.
• dashboard -includes the dashboard builder and viewer.
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• user -handles user actions and data, including authentication and sessions.
It enables the developers to add new modules. CoSSMic is currently using
EmonCMS version 8.0 , which is extended with new modules in order to implement
the GUI and Device integration components:
• devices module - provides functionalities to install, instantiate and use dif-
ferent drivers to control and manage real and virtual devices supported by
CoSSMic. It consists of a set of device templates and a device manager. A
device template includes data about: the device status, device type, machine
programmes and their load profiles.
• driver module - ensures the communication between the devices and the
EmonCMS. CoSSMic has developed the following drivers:
– Serial driver: integrating ModBus, MBus and IEC62056.
– CUL driver: for VHF-controlled smart plugs.
– Virtual driver: for testing and simulation.
• MAS module - provides Web and REST interface between the EmoncCMS
and the MAS.
3.3.1 The Multi Agent System
The SPADE2 framework is used to implement the MAS framework. SPADE 4
is an open source agent framework that is fully compliant with the FIPA speci-
fications. The framework uses its Python library to develop SPADE agents that
will participate in the energy negotiation in the neighborhood. It uses XMPP as
the transport protocol. A light embedded XMPP server is used as communication
layer that allows agents to communicate with each other within the smart home.
3.3.2 Home gateway
Raspberry Pi 2 Model B, is the chosen microcomputer which acts as a home
gateway from the CoSSMic. This microcomputer is cheap and easy to use. Other
microcomputers or existing home gateways with the right software and hardware
environment are also good candidates to deploy CoSSMicplatform.
The CoSSMic platform will be installed in every household by plugging the
Raspberry Pi into the power network and connecting to the internet through a
Wireless Local Area Network or wired Local Area Network connection. In our
4https://pypi.python.org/pypi/SPADE
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deployment, a wired LAN is used. In this way, the platform also joins the other
instances in the neighborhood.
3.3.3 Messaging technology /protocol
XMPP (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol) is an XML-based open stan-
dard protocol for real time interaction(messaging) and presence. It provides a way
to exchange XML data almost in real time. The XMPP protocol uses a decen-
tralised client-server architecture, where the server acts as an intermediary for the
message exchange. The XMPP servers provides security features such as: authen-
tication, channel encryption, prevention of address spoofing. It is also used for
user account registration, message relaying.
In the CoSSMic platform, there is a light XMPP server deployed in each
Raspberry Pi, that enables peer to peer communication between agents within
smart home. It also sustains server-to-server communication deployed in differ-
ent gateways (RPis). Another instance of XMPP server is deployed in the cloud
(cloud.cossmic.com). This one is responsible for collecting weather forecast up-
dates and notifying about the new updates to smart homes.
Agents communicate with each other over a peer to peer overlay. They use an
XMPP account to join the overlay, with a contact ID (username@domainname)
and password. Different agents can connect while sharing the same XMPP account,
with a different resource such as: username@domainname/resource. An XMPP
account represent an agent role. As a result, there are three types of accounts of
XMPP: task manager, actor manager and controller. The XMPP hosts a chatroom
for each neighborhood and it uses the chatroom mechanism to detect the presence
of agents in the neighborhood.
3.3.4 Wireless smart plug
The wireless smart plugs are used to remotely monitor and control the ih-house
appliances. A wireless smart plug is an easy-to-use controller that allows one to
remotely switch on and off the attached devices. Once tis controller is plugged into
the power outlet, the plugged in home appliances are controlled and scheduled via
a web GUI. Some of the smart plugs allow also measuring the energy consumption
of the connected devices. In the current trials of CoSSMic, a HomeMatic switch
actuator (Product ID:HM-ES-PMSw1-Pl ) with power metering capability is
the selected smart plug.
HomeMatic 5 is a line of home automation devices manufactured by eQ-3.
figure 5 shows the wireless smart plug HM-ES-PMSw1-Pl. Table 2 lists the
5http://www.homematic.com/
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Figure 5: HM-ES-PMSw1-PI wireless smart plug
specifications of this device. HM-ES-PMSw1-Plhas a channel button(red circle)
and a device status LED(blue circle).
Before embarking on using the HomeMatic device, it must be configured. The
device configuration is done automatically when the device is paired by pressing
and holding the channel button of the device for 5 seconds, until the LED starts
blinking. The LED will firstly blink slowly during acknowledging and rapidly
afterwards. The pairing functionality is not be always successful and it might
need to be repeated several times. The XML structure of the device configuration
file where the pink color means variable, is shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6: HM-ES-PMSw1-PI XML configuration file
Table 2: HomeMatic specifications
System name HomeMatic
Device short description: HM-ES-PMSw1-PI
Frequency 868.3 MHz
Bidirectional yes
Protocol HomeMatic: BidCos
Supply voltage 230V
Current consumption 13 A max
Price standard plug 40
Price smart plug with energy meter 50
Price USB transceiver 50
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CoSSMic components Technologies used
Mediator EmonCMS
MAS SPADE
Messaging technology /protocol XMPP
Home gateway Raspberry Pi 2 Model B
Wireless smart plug HomeMatic and FS20
using UHF for
communication with
Raspberry Pi
Table 3: Technologies used in the current CoSSMic trials
3.3.5 Devices
The smart home is equipped with various electrical devices, which are classified
as energy consuming, energy producing or energy storing. The device categories
used for the trials include: PV panels, refrigerator, washing machine and others.
Nodes, i.e., smart meters, sensors and smart plugs can be used to monitor devices
and to control them. Nodes and devices are identified by a node ID and device ID
in the EmonCMS. Drivers for real and virtual devices enable the communication
between the devices and the EmonCMS. The drivers help to assign a new node to
the newly connected devices in the system. Based on the type of the devices used,
there are two-ways to connect with the nodes:
• Virtual devices:
Virtual devices are used in the current trials to simulate real world devices.
They are implemented as a PHP web application with a REST interface
accepting and returning JSON data. In order to enable connection with the
nodes, the user browses through a list of templates in the GUI and assigns
a new virtual meter or controller.
• Physical devices:
CoSSMic uses smarts meters and wireless smart plugs to monitor and con-
trol real world appliances.Technologies such as UHF, ZigBee or WIFI and
protocols such as modbus are used by these controllers to enable connection
with the home gateway.
3.3.6 HomeMatic protocol
HomeMatic devices use a proprietary radio based communication protocol (Bidi-
rectional Communication Standard,BidCoS). This protocol is described in details
in section 2.
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4 Setting up a CoSSMic virtual environment
In this section, we will shortly provide the instructions on how to setup a basic
CoSSMic virtual environment for our testing purposes and elaborate on it further
in the CoSSMic installation . In our installation, the smart home is represented
by the Raspberry Pi with all its connected home appliances.
4.1 The setup of the virtual lab
4.1.1 Hardware
For our testing environment, it will be used a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B. Apart from
Raspberry Pi, the following equipments are also needed:
• Raspberry Pi accessories: power supply, HDMI cable, SD card(16 GB), Eth-
ernet cable.
• Monitor or TV
• Keyboard
• HomeMatic wireless smart plug: HM-ES-PMSw1-Pl
• USB CC1101 - Lite module - V3 (busware)
• A lamp for testing purposes
• PC or a smart phone or tablet with a browser enabled
4.2 Software
• A prepared Raspbian Jessie image containing the majority of changes done
to the OS
• PuTTY 6
• Win32DiskWriter 7
• Software components:
– EmonCMS
– CUL driver.
6http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/download.html
7https://sourceforge.net/projects/win32diskimager/
26
4.3 Hardware setup
figure 7 depicts how the all above components are going to be connected to each
other in order to simulate a CoSSMic environment.
Figure 7: CoSSMic hardware setup
Before plugging the above components in the Raspberry Pi , the prepared
image is written in the SD card and further configurations are done. You can
find a guide on how to do this procedure in the CoSSMic installation. After the
configurations, the Raspberry Pi will be ready for use.
We use a European extension cable to power on: HomeMatic and Pi. These
equipments can be also plugged directly into the wall power socket. The lamp is
plugged into the HomeMatic smart plug and the USB CC1101 into the Raspberry
Pi via its USB port.
4.4 Smart Home configuration
Now, one can access the web application from a browser in his PC or smart phone
by typing the following URL in the address bar: http://129.241.208.197/emoncms
Log in with the username tr02 and the password trondheim25 which are set
during the EmonCMS installation (see CoSSMic installation). Navigate to the
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Figure 8: The profile page of the CoSSMic user
Account tab and edit the location and timezone field in âĂĲMy ProfileâĂİ. In
our prototype settings, we used Trondheim as location and its timezone, as it is
shown in figure 8 .
4.5 Security testing
This section provides a guideline on how to evaluate the security of the current
deployed CoSSMic. It also provides a brief description of the automated tools used
for security testing purposes.
4.6 Technical documentation
Before analyzing the security of a smart device, it will be helpful to consult its
documentation. The documentation helps to understand how the device works,
its capabilities, whether the device has any default username and password or any
security related specification. In the case of the HomeMatic (product ID: HM-
ES-PMSw1-PI) smart plug, little is known about its technical specifications. The
technical documentation [32] did not provide any details regarding the security
mechanisms of the device.
4.6.1 Attack vectors
1. Web application security - The users interact with the smart home via
web interfaces using common web technologies, e.g. HTTP, Web services
(REST),etc. This makes smart home vulnerable to the traditional web vul-
nerabilities. Thus, the Web area can be assessed using popular resources
such as OWASP IOT Top 10 Project 8. These type of vulnerabilities can
8https://www.owasp.org/images/7/71/Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_2014-OWASP.pdf
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seriously result in dangerous attacks against the security and the privacy of
the user in the CoSSMic. Mostly, because there is only one user account for
CoSSMic, since the Multi Agent System supports one API key only. All the
other residents in a home should login with the same credentials. In this
way, having only one user with the admin rights in the system, allows the
attacker to completely take over the smart home in the case of a malicious
attack.
2. Sniffing attack - It is a passive attack where the attacker monitors the com-
munication in the smart home environment through a sniffer or networking
tool. This type of attack compromises the confidentiality of the transmitted
data in the smart home environment. Basically, every communication chan-
nel that does not enable encryption is vulnerable to a sniffing attack. The
following tools can be used to perform a sniffing attack:
3. Replay attack - In a replay attack in the smart home, the attacker first
captures the packet send from the home gateway to the home appliances
through a sniffer. Then he retransmits it later to the devices and taking in
this way the control of the home appliances.
4. Denial of Service attack - In a smart home environment, a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack intents to prevent legitimate users from using a network or
accessing network services. The attacker floods messages to smart devices
and/or servers connected to Internet in order to disrupt the network traffic
inside a smart home. Moreover, an attacker can send huge amount of mes-
sages in the internal network of the smart home in order to consume system
resources.
4.6.2 Tools used
• Kali Linux:
Kali Linux is a Debian-based Linux penetration testing platform used for
security and vulnerability assessment. It is the successor of BackTrack 5 R3
operating system. Kali Linux offers a wide range of pre-installed tools that
can be used for penetration testing, forensics and reverse engineering.
• The 868 MHz transceiver hardware:
The CC1101 USB Lite (CUL) stick is a transceiver that operates at frequency
band 868 MHz.The CUL used in this thesis is CUL v3.4 with a frequency 868
MHz. This transceiver uses a open source firmware (culfw) that supports
several wireless protocol including also BidCos. This hardware is used to
analyze the communication protocol between home gateway and the home
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appliances plugged into the HomeMatic wireless smart plug. Another goal,
is sending commands to the home appliances in the CoSSMic system.
• OWASP ZAP:
OWASP ZAP is an open source web application security scanner written
in Java. It integrates penetration testing tools for finding web application
vulnerabilities.
• TCPDump:
TCPDump was used to capture our main data in order to implement various
attacks against the system. It is a packet sniffer program that captures the
network traffic sent and received on a specific port. The captured traffic can
be stored in a file using the pcap format.
• Wireshark:
Another traffic analyzing tool we used, was Wireshark program. It is a
popular protocol analyzer. This tool was running on a Kali Linux machine.
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5 The security analysis of CoSSMic
Note: The CUL driver code analyzed for the authentication mechanism is provided
by the CoSSMic project.
The following chapter introduces the results from the security analysis of the
CoSSMic conducted according to the methodology presented in Section 1. Finally,
a technical evaluation of the security of the communication protocol between the
system and the HomeMatic device is provided.
5.1 Web application security
The user access CoSSMic through a web interface. The web interface of this smart
home system consists of one section: login. The user needs to authenticate in order
to access the CoSSMic. RESTful web services are used for user authentication
and authorization. The data are transmitted over plain HTTP, without TLS
encryption enabled.
5.1.1 Credentials leakage
Sensitive information such as the credentials are sent in plain text over the network.
This allows an attacker to easily intercept and steal these data by sniffing the
network traffic and performing an eavesdropping attack. As it is shown in Figure
9 , an attacker can uses a network sniffer such as Wireshark to reveal the username
(tr02) and the password (trondheim25).
Using another sniffing tool such as TCPdump, the API keys are also eaves-
dropped (see Figure 10). Now that the attacker has gained useful knowledge
about the system, it would be easy to bypass the authentication mechanism and
enter the system. The API keys should remain confidential. The impact of this
vulnerability is very serious considering the fact that there is only one account for
the users at a smart home.
5.1.2 Clickjacking attack
The parameter X-FRAME-OPTIONS Header is not set in some of the web pages,
based on an analysis from ZAP (Figure 11). The impact of this vulnerability in
the ZAP test is rated as medium, since it can cause a possible clickjacking attack.
The clickjacking attack is tested by running the script in 12. As you can see in
Figure 13, the content of the CoSSMic web interface can be embedded into another
site, making it vulnerable to clickjacking attacks.
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Figure 9: Sniffing user credentials with Wireshark
5.1.3 Remotely control the devices without being authorized
An attacker can easily control the devices connected to the HomeMatic smartplug
without being unauthorized in the system. As it was pointed out in 5.1.1, the API
key can be sniffed. In addition all the appliances plugged into the smartplug can
be controlled by a HTTP GET request. An attacker can simply type the following
URL in the browser: In this way, the attacker can switch on and off the smart
plug.
5.1.4 Denial of Service
A remote attacker can cause a Denial of Service attack by sending the URL in 15
with the HomeMatic device id, its status which is manipulated with a character
in the status parameter, instead of a number and the write API key. When the
attacker enter this URL, it will make the system unavailable. The status parameter
in the URL takes as a value a character, which is not a legit input value. The status
can only take numbers as values. We observe that the smart plug switches off when
the status was set to 0 and it switches on when the status was set to other numbers
(not only 1). An authorized user does not need to toggle a device through URL,
since there he can use a button in the web interface for that reason.
It is not difficult for a attacker to find the idof the connected devices, since
each of them is assigned a number which increases each time a new one is added
in the system. There is not any URL input validation. The attacker does not need
to login in the system, since he can use the API keys from a sniffing attack. The
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Figure 10: API keys sniffed with TCPdump
Figure 11: The X-FRAME-OPTIONS vulnerability shown in ZAP
system will not respond to the requests of the users at home. The home gateway
needs to be rebooted in order to function again.
5.1.5 Other vulnerabilities found
This section focuses on vulnerabilities found during a penetration testing but which
might have a low impact in the security of the system.
• Cookie HTTP only flag not set
The cookies do not have a HttpOnly flag enabled. The cookie can be acces-
sible from JavaScript.The impact of this vulnerability may be serious when
this cookie is a session one.
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Figure 12: Script for testing clickjacking attack
Figure 13: The login paged framed by a clickjacking attack
• Error Handling
An attacker gathers useful information after an unsuccessful login with the
wrong password. Figure 16 shows the error message after this attack. Hav-
ing information about the correct username but not the password, it might
probably reduce the attacker’s attempt to find the correct credentials.
5.2 HomeMatic device security
5.2.1 Attacks setup
Figure 17 illustrates the developed attack scenarios against the security of the
HomeMatic device described in the following sections. Two CUL transceivers
(same versions) are used in order to simulate the following attack scenarios. Transceiver
1 is connected to the USB serial port of the home gateway.Transceiver 2 is con-
nected to the USB serial port of a Linux machine. Once the transceiver is plugged
in, it should appear as /dev/ttyACM0 in the attacker’s Linux terminal. To start
using Transceiver 2 for network sniffing, a serial terminal on the Linux machine is
open by typing the shell command: sudo screen /dev/ttyACM0.
5.2.2 Attacks
Sniffing/Eavesdropping attack As it was expected from section , an attacker
can easily sniff and eavesdrops the traffic between the home gateway (Raspberry
Pi) and the HomeMatic HM-ES-PMSw1-PI smart plug. As it is shown in the
previous section, the communication between HomeMatic smart plug and smart
home is unencrypted.
1. Plug in a lamp in the smart plug to start energy control and monitor.
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Figure 14: API key added in the URL
Figure 15: The URL sending from the attacker performing a DoS attack
2. Type "Ar" command in the Linux terminal to start BidCos packet intercep-
tion.A stands for AskSin, that is what the BidCos implementation in the
CUL firmware is called and r is to enable BidCos reception.
3. Turn ON the smart plug via the web GUI. Transceiver 1 sends the command
to the HomeMatic device.
4. The LED blinks red in the smart plug and the lamp is switched on. The
following BidCos packets each prefixed with "A", are received in the terminal:
The following sections describes how the authentication mechanism works on
this HomeMatic device.
The same testing configuration is setup for sending a turn OFF command to
the HomeMatic HM-ES-PMSw1-PI. The received frames by sniffing the commu-
nication are:
Replay attackUsing the available tools, a replay attack is successfully mounted.
The message counter in the packet frame is incremented once per each data trans-
mission. But that is not enough to prevent a replay attack, since there was no
need to increment the counter byte in the packet used for retransmission. This
sort of attack is easy to perform and does not any require expensive tools. A
replay attack can disrupt the functioning of the whole smart home system. The
majority of the devices in the current smart home system are controlled via smart
plugs. Therefore, the impact of this attack may be severe for the smart home. An
attacker could instantly perform a replay attack at a specific device attached to a
smart plug, overriding in this way the planned schedule without giving any notice
to the user.
1. Using the culfw command As , the attacker will resend the first captured
packet in an attempt to turn ON the lamp:
As 0E3BA011F1103424A4800201C80000
2. The LED blinks red in the smart plug and the lamp is switched on. The
following frames are received, where the last one is the acknowledgement
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Figure 16: Information leakage during a login with wrong password
one:
As it can be observed, the acknowledgement received in the replay attack
is the same as in the proper data transmission.
The same experiments are carried out for a replay attack of the turn OFF
command. After sending out the following command:
As 0E3DA011F1103424A4800201000000
3. The LED stops blinking and the lamp is switched off. The following frames
are received, where the last one is the acknowledgement one:
5.3 Authentication mechanism
The authentication mechanism used between the HomeMatic HM-ES-PMSw1-PI
device and the home gateway presented here is based on the code analysis of the
CUL driver. It includes four messages. The first message is the initial message
sent from the initiator to the HomeMatic device (Figure 22 ). In this case, it is a
turn ON command (see 18). The second message is the acknowledgment command
sent from the HomeMatic device to the home gateway. The third message contains
information about the energy load of a connected device with the smart plug such
as: energy, current, frequency and voltage. The HomeMatic devices sends these
data to the home gateway. These data will be later represented graphically in the
web interface of the system.
The fourth message sends a received acknowledgment message to the Home-
Matic device from the home gateway. The authentication mechanism ends here.
After 3 minutes, the third message is sent again with a different payload. Due to
the limit time, it was not possible to decipher the payload. Based on the authen-
tication mechanism described in this section, the third frame sent contains the
updated energy parameters.
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Figure 17: An attack against the devices connected with HomeMatic
Figure 18: Packet frames received after a turn ON command
5.4 Packet frame
The structure of a packet frame captured in the above sections is described in
Figure 26. The given packet represents the turn ON command. Also, the structure
of the payload for the HomeMatic HM-ES-PMSw1-PI device is described in this
picture.
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Figure 19: Packet frames received after a turn OFF command
Figure 20: Packet frames received after a turn ON replay attack
Figure 21: Packet frames received after a turn OFF replay attack
Figure 22: Code snippet for the first frame sent
Figure 23: Code snippet for the second frame sent
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Figure 24: Code snippet for the third frame sent
Figure 25: Code snippet for the fourth frame sent
Figure 26: The structure of the packet frame and the payload
39
6 Results and discussion
The security analysis conducted in section 5 showed that CoSSMic smart home
technology is not a secure system. In this chapter, we discuss about the insecurity
implications on the CoSSMic. Furthermore, it also describes some existing security
countermeasures to mitigate the associated vulnerabilities.
6.1 Insecurity of the CoSSMic system
CoSSMic is a complex system consisting of multiple technologies and devices. The
system demonstrated to be prone of several vulnerabilities that require urgent
mitigation. CoSSMic is still under the development phase. Thus, security and
privacy concerns should be evaluated and mitigated in the early phases of the
product lifecycle [20]. More sophisticated attacks can be implemented against
this smart home technology [20]. HomeMatic smart plug demonstrated to posses
serious vulnerabilities, due to the lack of a strong authentication mechanism, that
can affect the well-function of the whole CoSSMic system. Ensuring strong mutual
authentication and encryption is fundamental for the smart devices [23]. Replacing
the current version of the HomeMatic smart plug with a new one will not be costly,
but it will have a great impact on the whole system since the majority of the devices
in the home are connected with it.
6.1.1 Countermeasures
The proposed countermeasures are based on our security analysis and the limi-
tations that comes from the CoSSMic project such as only open-source software,
specific hardware (Raspberry Pi and HomeMatic).
6.1.2 Anti-clickjacking attack
X-Frame-Options HTTP response header can be used to avoid clickjacking attacks
in a website. There are three possible settings for the X-Frame options[33]:
• DENY: This value will prevent a web page from being framed.
• SAMEORIGIN:This value will allow a page only to be displayed in a frame
on the same origin as the page itself.
• ALLOW-FROM uri: This value will allow a page to be displayed in a frame
on the specified uri.
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6.1.3 HTTPS
The security analysis of the CoSSMic in section 5 showed the use of HTTP pro-
tocol. When HTTP protocol is used, the traffic is sent in plaintext. It allows the
attacker to see/modify the traffic (man-in-the-middle attack). HTTPS is a secure
version of HTTP âĂŞ it uses SSL/TLS to protect the data of the application layer.
When HTTPS is used, the following properties are achieved: authentication, data
integrity, confidentiality.
6.1.4 VPN
A VPN connection gives the user the capability to have a remote and private
connection with the CoSSMic system. VPN provides end-to-end encryption. Based
on the requirements of the CoSSMic, it is recommended to use the OpenVPN9.
OpenVPN supports the use of strong security protocol Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
on the Lighttpd webserver of the CoSSMic.
6.1.5 API key
API keys are used for authentication and authorization in the target system. They
should not be passed explicitely in the URL.
6.1.6 HomeMatic
It would be better to change the HomeMatic device with another device of the
same company. KeyMatic is another device developed by the same company as
HomeMatic but it claims to be secure thanks to AES encryption.
9https://openvpn.net/
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7 Conclusion and future work
This Master’s thesis covers the security and privacy challenges of a smart home
technology such as CoSSMic. The thesis provides a theoretical background on the
security and privacy issues found in the smart home system. The main contribu-
tions of the thesis are:
1. Provide a literature study of security and privacy of smart home technology.
2. Security analysis of the CoSSMic system.
3. Security analysis of the HomeMatic smart plug
4. Proposed countermeasures for the vulnerabilities found.
7.1 Future work
For further studies, a technical security analysis of the Multi Agent System com-
ponent should be included once it is working in the CoSSMic trials. Furthermore,
different technologies used for the energy negotiation should be described and
compared regarding security challenges. Also, a mitigation should be provided for
every vulnerability found in the system.
Another direction for future work could be the impact that an insecure CoSS-
Mic system would have in the public grid.
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A CoSSMic installation
CoSSMic installation
1. Preparing the SD card:
Firstly, the image is prepared to be written in the SD card :
(a) Insert the SD card into the slot for SD cards of your PC (if the PC has
one), otherwise into a card reader. Then connect the card reader with
the PC and check which drive letter it has been assigned
(b) run Win32DiskWriter
(c) click the folder icon and choose the prepared Raspbian Jessie lite image
file
(d) under Device,choose the drive letter of the SD card
(e) click write
(f) Once writing has finished, close Win32DiskWriter program and eject
the SD card from the reader.
With the prepared image in the SD card, the next preparations on the
SD card are done as follows:
(g) insert the SD card into the Raspberry Pi
(h) connect the monitor with the Pi via HDMI cable
(i) connect to the internet via ethernet cable and then plug the keyboard,
power supply into the Raspberry Pi Once the Raspberry Pi is turned
on, it will take approximately one minute to boot it. The Raspberry
Pi is automatically assigned an IP via DHCP. It can be accessed via its
IP, which would be found by:
(j) login in the Raspberry Pi with username pi and password CoSSMic
(k) type sudo ifconfig in the command line and next to the eth0 entry, it
will show inet addr: 129.241.208.197 which is the IP address of the
Raspberry Pi Now, you can connect to the raspberry via SSH using
PuTTY. You can finish the SD card preparation by manually resizing
the variable partition to fit within the card and to provide some unused
space for future data.
(l) Therefore, we type the following commands in the command line:
• sudo service cron stop && sudo service mysql stop && sudo service
redis-server stop && sudo service lighttpd stop && sudo service
supervisor stop && sudo service ufw stop
• sudo umount /dev/mmcblk0p3 -l
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(m) Next, resize the partition to fit the SD card:
• sudo fdisk /dev/mmcblk0
• Enter p, to show the list of partitions
• Enter d , to create a new partition
• Enter 3, which is the partition number that would be deleted
• Enter p again, to show the list of partitions with the new modifi-
cations
• Enter n, to create a new partition from the same starting sector
• Enter p, for primary partition
• Enter 3, the partition number
• Enter 6422528 , as the first sector number
• Press "Enter" to automatically select the last sector
• Enter "p" to get the following result of partitions.
(n) Write the changes to SD card:
• Enter w
• sudo reboot
(o) Expand the filesystem to the new partition by checking the file system
and then resizing it:
• sudo e2fsck -f /dev/mmcblk0p3
• sudo resize2fs /dev/mmcblk0p3
(p) Mount all the partitions:
sudo mount -a
2. Personalization of the Raspberry Pi
The configurations of the Raspberry Pi are modified with the following com-
mands:
• sudo raspi-config
• Go to: internationalisation options > Change locale settings in order
to select the desired locales.
• Go to: internationalisation options > Change the timezone to choose
the correct timezone. We choose:Europe/Oslo
• Uncomment and edit the date.timezone variable to add “Europe/Oslo”
in /etc/php5/cgi/php.ini file.
3. Authentication:
In this section, we will disable the direct root login and replace the default
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password authentication with a RSA generated SSH-key. The key-pair is
creating on Windows using PuTTYgen 10. Using the default settings (SSH-2
RSA and 2048 bit encryption), a private and a public key are generated.
• Save the private key to a secure location
• Copy the public key for the user pi at the file:
/home/pi/.ssh/authorized_keys file .
• If the file does not exist, then create one:
mkdir /.ssh
touch /.ssh/authorized_keys
• Next, modify the file /etc/ssh/sshd_config with the following lines:
PermitRootLogin no
AllowUsers pi
RSAAuthentication yes
PubkeyAuthentication yes
AuthorizedKeysFile
PasswordAuthentication no
• Restart SSH service:
sudo service ssh restart
4. Installation of EmonCMS:
• hg clone https://bitbucket.org/cossmic/emoncms /var/www/emoncms
• hg pull -u -R /var/www/emoncms
• Create a MySQL database:
– mysql -u root -p
– the required password is CoSSMic
– Type:
SET PASSWORD FOR ’tr01’@’localhost’ = PASSWORD(’trondheim25’);
– CREATE DATABASE emoncms;
CREATE USER ’tr01’@’localhost’ IDENTIFIED BY ’trondheim25’;
– Give permisions on the new database: GRANT ALL ON emoncms.*
TO ’tr01’@’localhost’;
10http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/download.html
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flush privileges;
exit
• The database settings need to be updated after the new password is
enabled. Thus, To do this, make a copy of the default settings and call
it settings.php.
cp /var/www/emoncms/default.settings.php /var/www/emoncms/set-
tings.php
• Update the file: /var/www/emoncms/settings.php with the following
lines:
$server = "localhost";
$database = "emoncms";
$username = "tr01";
$password = "trondheim25";
• To provide access with the CoSSMic cloud server, change the YOUR_NBH_API_KEY
with 5544b076ff0c3eb0fc9fbe0aa39e6acf in the /var/www/emon-
cms/settings.php file. // $cossmic[’host’] = ’http://cloud.cossmic.eu/emoncms/’;
$cossmic[’apikey’] = ’YOUR_NBH_API_KEY’;
$cossmic[’node’] = 0;
• EmonCMS can now be accessed in the browser: http://129.241.208.197/emoncms
• When the EmonCMS is accessed for the first time, the user will be
directed to a register screen. We create a new user by entering the
username tr02 and password trondheim25 and clicking register to
finish.
• Now, we can disable EmonCMS’ database test and initiation by modi-
fying the file /var/www/emoncms/settings.php with the following lines:
$allowusersregister = FALSE;
$dbtest = FALSE;
• The EmonCMS is ready to use.
5. CUL driver installation:
The installation of the CUL driver is documented in the CoSSMic repository
which is not public yet.
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